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Memorandum for Holders
USIB-D-39.7/20
3 May 1967

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR HOLDERS OF USIB-D-39.7/20

SUBJECT : Committee on Documentation Report of
Task Team I (Control Content)

REFERENCE : USIB-D-39.7/20, dated 3 May 1967

It is requested that the number of the reference document be changed

to USIB-D-39.7/21 in all copies.

USIB/S

NSC review completed - may be declassified in full

DIA review(s)
completed.

ARMY review(s)
completed.

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USIB-D-39.7/20
16 February 1967

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT   :   Systems Training for Intelligence Personnel

REFERENCE   :   a. PFIAB memorandum to the President,
Subject: U.S. Intelligence Community
Capabilities for Handling of Intelligence
Information, dated 15 June 1965 (approved
by the President and forwarded by Mr. McGeorge
Bundy to the Director for action on 15 July 1965)
b. USIB-D-39.7/11, 24 September 1965

1. The enclosed memorandum from the Chairman of the
Committee on Documentation (CODIB) and the attached CODIB report on
this subject are submitted for USIB consideration as a response to
PFIAB Recommendation No. 1 in reference a. (this recommendation is
quoted in full on pages 1 and 2 of the CODIB report). The initial USIB
response to this recommendation is contained in the attachment to
reference b.

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2. ☐memorandum outlines briefly the background
of the report and summarizes the reasons for CODIB's rejection of the
concept of a community-controlled Intelligence Systems Institute to
develop and administer information science training programs. It also
summarizes CODIB's new approach to a balanced program of systems
training and its possible costs, as well as recent steps which have
been taken within the intelligence community to further systems training
for intelligence personnel.

*Record of Board
action attached.*

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USIB-D-39.7/20
16 February 1967

USIB Action Requested

3. Board Members are requested to advise the Secretariat no later than close of business 24 February of their concurrence in or other views on the CODIB recommendations in Section 6, pages 21 and 22 of the attached CODIB report.

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Executive Secretary   25X1

Attachments

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CODIB-D-113/5.7
2 February 1967

UNITED   STATES   INTELLIGENCE   BOARD

COMMITTEE ON DOCUMENTATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT   :   Systems Training for Intelligence Personnel

REFERENCE   :   PFIAB memorandum to the President,
                 Subject: U.S. Intelligence Community
                 Capabilities for Handling of Intelligence
                 Information, dated 15 June 1965
                 (approved by the President and forwarded
                 by Mr. McGeorge Bundy to the Director for
                 action on 15 July 1965)

   1.   The attached report on Information Science Training
for Intelligence Community Personnel has been prepared by the
Committee on Documentation (CODIB) in response to Recommendation
#1 on systems training of the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board (PFIAB).   The report explores the significance
of the PFIAB recommendation in the context of the community's
overall information science training requirements, and recommends
actions designed to qualify more intelligence personnel in systems
work.

   2.   The problem of information science training for
intelligence community personnel has been under study since
the fall of 1965.   The first formal community review was con-
ducted last summer and was based upon a report of a CODIB
working group which centered on the concept of a community-
controlled Intelligence Systems Institute to develop and
administer information science training programs.   CODIB
rejected the Institute concept because of its high cost,
duplication of existing training facilities, lack of curriculum
flexibility, and anticipated difficulties in obtaining profes-
sionally competent staffing.   A new approach was then undertaken
resulting in the present report with its stress on utilization
of existing university, industry, and Governmental training
facilities.

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> downgrading and
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3. In keeping with this approach, we have concluded that the intelligence community should strive for a balanced program featuring:

> o   university-level education in the formal discipline of information sciences;
>
> o   inclusion of additional data handling instruction in established curricula of Government intelligence training facilities; and
>
> o   specialized training courses aimed at applying information science technology to specific intelligence problems.

CODIB recommends that the latter be provided at the Defense Intelligence School.

4. The cost of providing this training, of course, will vary considerably according to the number of students involved. In the case of university-type education, the largest single element of training cost would be the salary paid to the student while in training ⟨   ⟩ per year in mid-   25X1 supervisory grades). Tuition at the best universities would not exceed $2,000 on the average, though an additional $3,000 would be needed in cases involving travel and the movement of household effects. In the case of specialized training courses at the Defense Intelligence School, it is estimated that an initial amount ⟨   ⟩ would be required to develop   25X1 and provide specialized courses of 2-3 months' duration each for a total of approximately 90 students per year.

5. As members of the Board know, community concern for systems training was evident well in advance of the PFIAB recommendation of 15 June 1965. For some years now, most agencies and departments have been enrolling their personnel in various types of information handling programs, ranging from short ADP orientation courses to full-time university degree programs in information sciences. Recent steps taken to improve further community competence include:

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In forwarding the report to PFIAB it would be appropriate to refer to this progress.

6. One further point should be noted. This report reflects the belief that the responsibility for determining whom to train and what to teach must remain with the head of each agency. Therefore, the recommendations made (pp. 21 and 22), unlike those we have made in many other areas, call for a minimum of centralized, community-wide direction or monitoring.

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Chairman
USIB Committee on Documentation

Attachment

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CODIB-D-113/5.7
2 February 1967

UNITED   STATES   INTELLIGENCE   BOARD

COMMITTEE ON DOCUMENTATION

INFORMATION SCIENCE TRAINING FOR

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

CODIB-D-113/5.7
2 February 1967

INFORMATION SCIENCE TRAINING FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL

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INFORMATION SCIENCE TRAINING FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL

1. INTRODUCTION

   a. This report concerns the training of intelligence community
personnel in the academic disciplines of information science and the
technical skills associated with the mechanized handling of intelligence
information. The report responds to the "system training" recommenda-
tion of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board forwarded
to the Director of Central Intelligence for implementation in July 1965.

   b. This report stresses the necessity for a balanced program
which provides a wide range of training in the skills and techniques
of employing the information sciences in our day-to-day intelligence
jobs, as well as the long-term, formal education of selected personnel
in university graduate-level information science programs. The
conclusions and recommendations presented herein are aimed at
achieving such a balanced program which recognizes both the need for
different types of training and the practical hardships imposed on the
manager by participation in extensive training activities.

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4. <u>DISCUSSION</u>

   a. <u>Observations on Current Status</u>

      (1) With the possible exception of a very few systems,
   including some of those in the cryptologic area, the intelligence

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community hasn't had any greater success (or failure) in developing
truly effective automated information handling systems than have
the other functional areas of the Federal Government. The
community's exploitation of available technology has been limited
in many instances to the development of information storage
and retrieval systems which duplicate but do not necessarily
improve upon existing manual processes. There has not been
enough progress in designing advanced, revolutionary methods of
handling intelligence information and giving the production analyst
new analytical tools. For example, not many community analysts
today have systems which permit them to turn to a console and use
the computational power of a digital computer to quickly test a
quantitative hypothesis or manipulate data in a trend analysis
or receive electronic displays of information. In most instances,
the analyst has not been integrated into his supporting system
and must communicate with the system through intermediaries. The
community's system development pattern is influenced by the new-
ness of technology and the lack of personnel qualified to effec-
tively exploit that technology.

(2) The pressures to keep current on daily operations have
influenced the pattern of training information-system personnel.
The primary objective of training has been to produce technicians
who can extract some measure of work from available hardware;
there hasn't been much emphasis on the training of information
system theoreticians and strategists. In effect, we have concen-
trated on the training of "pilots" and not "aeronautical engineers".
An appropriate mix of both the specialist/technician and the
theoretician/strategist is needed to develop the types of systems
that are required and are now within technical grasp.

(3) Systems or information science knowledge, theoretical
as well as practical, needs to be imparted to substantive informa-
tion people as well as systems or data processing people. The
user of information systems cannot afford to leave the conceptual
design of his future systems completely in the hands of the systems
specialist.

(4) The intelligence community does not have an integrated
program of graduate level information sciences education. Al-
though a small number of community personnel are receiving such
training by various means, e.g., full-time resident study, off-
campus study, and special Government/industry courses, there is
little evidence of positive, broad scale action to cope with
what may well be the community's major training problem. The community's

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efforts to date certainly do not approach the magnitude of
the National Library of Medicine's attempt to establish a
Master of Science degree in Biomedical Communication involving
over five universities (Georgia Tech, Tulane, Nebraska, Texas
and others). The community's actions to date have not
contributed significantly to the training and development of
a cadre of information scientists.

(5) It should be noted here that, while training is an
acknowledged necessity in almost every type of activity, the
manager assigned the responsibility for mission accomplishment
cannot close his shop while he trains his people to some
optimum level of proficiency. While most managers realize
that they can do a better job with better, more highly trained
people, there are real obstacles in the way of getting
better people. In the practical environment of daily opera-
tions, heavy production schedules, security and space
problems and budgetary limitations, training frequently
becomes an activity which must be judiciously squeezed into
overall operations without significant detriment to mission
accomplishment. In this context, training is used whenever
it will contribute to longer range objectives without jeopard-
izing the accomplishment of current objectives. The pace of
training in the information science area has been geared
generally to the community's capability to reasonably absorb
and effectively use automatic equipment in the handling of
intelligence information. This means, then, that the
community has concentrated on training its people to
exploit existing information technology, and has given
significantly less attention to training people to exploit
future technology. The intelligence community, because of
its accumulated experience with ADP and the advances in
information science technology, is aware of the need for
a wide range of training programs, including graduate
level systems training of the type recommended by the
PFIAB.

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6. RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that USIB:

a. Endorse this report and, wherever feasible, use its good offices to promote community-wide recognition of the importance of developing an adequate number of personnel effectively trained in information science technology.

b. Request the Director of each USIB department or agency to provide top management support for the development of agency policies which:

(1) offer inducements to qualified personnel to acquire training in information science technology,

(2) allow managers to double encumber some positions to compensate for the absence of personnel in training,

(3) stress recruitment of personnel who already have information science training,

(4) encourage their intelligence training organizations to include more courses in information processing and management and the analytical applications of information science techniques, and

(5) provide for the most effective utilization of personnel who obtain training in information science technology.

c. Request each USIB agency or department, not now so engaged, to inventory, in the context of intelligence support, its present systems and information science personnel resources, assess its present and future needs, identify personnel who should receive systems or information science training, develop and maintain training

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schedules, and select the first increment of students for enrollment in university graduate information science programs convening in the fall of 1967.

d. Request the Director, DIA, to develop and provide specialized courses at the Defense Intelligence School to train community personnel in the application of information science technology to specific intelligence problems'' (see paragraph 4.e). Such courses should not duplicate courses available elsewhere, but rather bridge the gap between course coverage at other training facilities and the practical environment of intelligence operations.

e. Direct CODIB to establish appropriate relationship with the Committee on Scientific and Technical Information (COSATI) of the Federal Council for Science and Technology in order to further the information science programs of the Federal Government in relation to the training needs of the intelligence community.

f. Report to the PFIAB that these actions are being taken in response to its Recommendation No. 1 of 15 June 1965, and that they are in part contingent upon approval of required funding and personnel resources.

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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

TELEPHONE VOTE ACTION

SUBJECT : Systems Training for Intelligence Personnel

REFERENCE : USIB-D-39.7/20, 16 February 1967

DUE DATE : COB 24 February

Agency	Vote	By	Date
			25X1
CIA	Concur		16 Mar
State	Concur		27 Feb
DIA	Concur w/c*		28 Feb
NSA	Concur		24 Feb
AEC	Concur w/c*		28 Feb
FBI	Concur w/c*		1 Mar

Remarks: See attached memoranda.

Approved by DCI on 25 March 1967

Record USIB-M-469, 30 March 1967, Secretary's Note
and

NOTE: The memoranda to the Chairman, PFIAB,/the Secretary of Defense, (with copy to Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology) from the DCI were dispatched on 27 March 1967.

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25 March 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board

SUBJECT : Systems Training for Intelligence Personnel

1. I am attaching for the Board's information the report of USIB's Committee on Documentation on providing systems training for intelligence personnel. USIB approved this report on 25 March 1967.

2. In transmitting this report to you, I wish to note that over the last 18 months increased emphasis has been put by the intelligence community on training personnel in the information sciences. The formal training facilities of Government, industry and the academic world have been used extensively to train more people in more subjects.

3. We have also provided excellent opportunities for on-the-job-training through assignments to advanced information processing projects such as

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4. I feel certain that the implementation of the recommendations of this report will lead to further improvement in this important area of the Board's concern.

SIGNED

Richard Helms
Chairman

Attachment

cc: Special Assistant to the President
for Science and Technology
Secretary of Defense

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2 5 MAR 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Robert S. McNamara
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT : Establishment of Training Courses at the
Defense Intelligence School in Application
of Information Science Technology to
Intelligence

1. I am attaching for your information a report on
Information Science Training for Intelligence Community
Personnel, together with my memorandum transmitting it to
the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

2. The report was prepared in response to a recommendation
made by the President's Board to provide specialized training
in information systems thinking and skills to selected per-
sonnel in the intelligence community. In approving the
recommendation, the President requested that it be carried
out by the intelligence community under my coordination.

3. The report, prepared by USIB's Committee on
Documentation, has now been completed and concurred in by
all members of the Board, including the Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency. It recommends a balanced training
program consisting of: (a) graduate level training for
selected intelligence personnel at universities which have
an outstanding program in the field of information science
technology; (b) inclusion of additional data handling
instruction in established curricula of present Government
Intelligence training facilities; and (c) specialized train-
ing courses at the Defense Intelligence School in applying
information science technology to specific categories of
intelligence problems.

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4. Although all three facets of this program apply to the Department of Defense, the third one is a responsibility proposed uniquely for the Defense Intelligence Agency. What is proposed is specialized training at the Defense Intelligence School for personnel of all departments and agencies of the intelligence community designed to provide mid-career training to military and civilian intelligence personnel in the application of information science technology to intelligence problems. Hopefully the services of outstanding authorities could be enlisted to assist carefully selected in-house personnel in the development of these courses.

5. As a vital part of the overall effort to carry out the President's request that intelligence personnel be provided training in information science technology, I would appreciate it if the Department of Defense would undertake, on a priority basis, the development of these specialized courses at the Defense Intelligence School. As you know, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering has a member on the USIB Committee on Documentation and is thus aware of this proposed program. Also, I understand that this matter has been discussed informally with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration).

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Richard Helms
Director

Attachment: a/s

Distribution:
   Orig. & 1 - Addressee w/o att.
         1 - DCI w/o att.
        _1 - DDCI w/att.
         1 - ER w/o att.
         1 - DDI w/att.
         1 - ISS Chrono w/o att.
         1 - PAB Chrono w/o att.
         1 - CODIB Chrono w/o att.
         1 - Systems Training File w/att.

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10 February 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT   :   Systems Training for Intelligence Personnel

REFERENCES   :   a.   Report of CODIB: Information Science Training for Intelligence Community Personnel (CODIB-D-113/5.7, dated 2 Feb 1967)

                 b.   PFIAB memorandum to the President, Subject: U.S. Intelligence Community Capabilities for Handling of Intelligence Information, dated 15 Jun 1965 (approved by the President and forwarded by Mr. McGeorge Bundy to the Director for action on 15 Jul 1965)

     1.   This report (reference a) has been prepared by USIB's Committee on Documentation (CODIB) as a response to PFIAB Recommendation #1 contained in reference b (see page 4 of TAB A).

     2.   The Director made a progress report on this matter to the PFIAB on 2 October 1965; another was made by Chairman CODIB on 27 July 1966.

     3.   A CODIB Working Group had earlier completed a report on this subject. This was rejected by CODIB because its central premise was the creation of an Intelligence Systems Institute with a comprehensive curriculum. In CODIB's view, such an Institute would not be consistent either with PFIAB views or with intelligence needs as we see them in the context of programs already available. Hence the present text which stresses the use of existing academic and service facilities.

4.   I checked the present text informally with Dr. William Baker, PFIAB member having special interest in this subject, and with Mr. William Knox, Chairman of PFIAB's Guidance and Evaluation Panel. Both consider the report responsive to the problem.

5.   In view of the special costs to DIA of implementing recommendation d (page 22) on behalf of the community, General Carroll has requested that you inform the Secretary of Defense of USIB's action.

6.   Recommendations

 o That you approve the CODIB report, with particular reference to the recommendations on pages 21 and 22 (TAB B).

 o That you sign the attached covering note from you to Chairman PFIAB forwarding the report to PFIAB for information (TAB C).

 o That you sign the attached letter to Secretary McNamara (TAB D).

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Chairman
USIB Committee on Documentation

Attachments: a/s

cc: CIA Member USIB
  D/DCI/NIPE
  Executive Secretary USIB
  Secretary CODIB

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Attachment (a)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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Executive Registry

65 - 4/126/

July 15, 1965

NSC review completed - may be declassified in full

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: U. S. Intelligence Community Capabilities
for the Handling of Intelligence Information

Enclosed herewith is a report and recommendations
which the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
submitted to the President under date of June 15, 1965.

The President has approved the three recommendations
contained in the report.

It is requested that Recommendations 1 and 2 of the
report be carried out by the intelligence community
under your coordination, and that you submit to this
office and to the President's Board by October 1, 1965
a progress report reflecting the actions taken.

With respect to Recommendation No. 3, this office
will look to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board and the Special Assistant to the President for
Science and Technology, for periodic reports concerning
the activities of the Panel to be established pursuant
to that recommendation. To assure proper linkage of the
Panel with the broader interests of the Bureau of the
Budget in automatic data-processing generally, it is
suggested that the Director of the Bureau of the Budget
designate a representative of the Bureau to maintain
liaison with the Panel.

McGeorge Bundy

Enclosure

cc: The Secretary of State
      The Secretary of Defense
      The Director, Bureau of the Budget
      The Special Assistant to the President
          for Science and Technology
      The Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence
          Advisory Board

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Attachment (b)

Executive Registry
65 - 4126

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

NSC review completed - may be declassified in full

June 15, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: U. S. Intelligence Community Capabilities
for the Handling of Intelligence Information

This report is based on a study made by the Communications Panel of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. The study included consultations with knowledgeable representatives of the departments and agencies making up the U. S. intelligence community, and briefings supplied by the Committee on Documentation of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) which, under the chairmanship of the Director of Central Intelligence, has been pursuing the current exercise known as SCIPS (Staff for Community Information Processing Study).

Our Panel's study leads us to the following conclusions and resultant recommendations for action in an area of U. S. intelligence activities which we consider to have a most important bearing on the national defense and security.

The principal objective of these recommendations is the prompt initiation by the U. S. intelligence community of positive steps toward the achievement of an improved capability for the efficient storage and retrieval of the intelligence product, through an appropriate combination of machine and human techniques for the management and control of the massive volume of intelligence information involved.

CONCLUSIONS:

1. Information-handling methods occupy a pervasive position in the whole administrative framework of the U. S. intelligence community. Present methods for handling the huge quantity of intelligence information, which is generated from day-to-day by a vast array of collection resources, are a determining factor in the effectiveness of our entire intelligence system to meet national security needs at policy and command levels of the Government.

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2. The systems problems involved are so massive
and in many cases so expensive, in both money and human
resources, that customary routines have often been
rigidly embodied and retained. The systems problems of
intelligence information access will continue to be of
the most difficult type, heightening the importance of
great improvements in the depth of understanding and
of skills in tackling the wide variety of such problems
which confront all levels of Government personnel
concerned with access to the national intelligence base.

3. There is a necessary relationship of the United
States Intelligence Board SCIPS study to the existing
practices of information handling which are variously
applied within the respective agencies engaged in the
U. S. intelligence effort, particularly in regard to such
matters as file format and file control methods. However,
the present great demands for effective handling of infor-
mation within the intelligence community require that
additional actions go forward concurrently with those
presently approved by the United States Intelligence Board.

4. The additional actions which are required provide
the only foreseeable means of extending to the massive
operations of the intelligence community the advantages
of high-speed machine processing of both numerical and non-
numerical information in a way which has already been
applied in such specific areas of intelligence as cryptanalysis.
Unless strong and immediate actions are undertaken in this
area, there is danger that the efficiency of the production
and dissemination of intelligence within the intelligence
community will decline progressively, and that the already
high costs involved will climb so steeply as to jeopardize
national support of the broad intelligence effort.

5. Positive action is required now to supplement the
longer-range Task Force projects being pursued by the United
States Intelligence Board. A large share of the needed
technical support will come from automatic data-processing
machinery and methods, and from the resources of modern
science and technology which are presently available to
assist in meeting intelligence community needs for
document handling all the way from initial production
to final distribution. The need for new intelligence
community actions for the handling and routine processing
of intelligence information is not regarded as a direct
consequence of the rise of the electronic computer.
The need for such actions is more deeply the result of
the growth of the intelligence community effort and the
greater growth of the information which it must handle.

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The role of the computer is in offering a new way to assist
in the reduction of greatly increasing problems in the
intelligence field. The existence of these problems and
the need to do things about them would have confronted
the intelligence community in any event.

6. All the technical areas which must contribute
to the problems of handling intelligence information are
advancing very rapidly at present. The intelligence
community, with its strong nucleus concerned with the use
of computers in cryptanalytic and communications operations,
has a real advantage in undertaking early and skillful
planning in the information-handling area. (It would,
however, be a mistake to assume that this experience can
be easily applied to the use of computers in the handling
of intelligence information.) The required planning and
actions can be not only of great value to the intelligence
community, but can be a broad and effective stimulus to
improvement in other Federal Government computer operations
whose importance is reflected in the President's recent
message to the Congress on the use of automatic data-
processing equipment.

7. The problems of the intelligence community in
connection with information access and retrieval include,
but are not restricted to, those common to all who must
maintain very large bodies of information in accessible form.
This is even true in the handling of information from un-
classified sources. The importance of negative information,
and of patterns of information, requires that access to
intelligence information produce a completeness of response
beyond that which is expected from many large files of
stored information. Like statistics, intelligence cannot
be satisfied with the highly anecdotal, but requires that all
available items of information are allowed to contribute
their part to the final summary or other intelligence
product.

8. As a consequence of intelligence community require-
ments for high recall, the mechanized and automated means
of access to many sorts of intelligence files cannot be
required to meet simultaneously, rigid requirements as to
relevance. Accordingly for some time to come the mode of
gaining access to intelligence information will be through
combined machine-human systems that will seek the machine re-
trieval of stored intelligence information in order that
its relevance may be established by human examination.
It is this combined machine-human factor which generates
systems problems of great difficulty and dimensions.

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9. Ways and means must be sought by the intelligence community to enlarge the proficiency of personnel presently engaged in information-handling activities, either through (a) the retraining of personnel so engaged, or (b) the addition of new personnel having experience with systems work, preferably (but not necessarily) in the information sciences and technologies.

10. The scope of the intelligence community's problems in the information-handling field is such that it requires the guidance of a Panel of Technical Experts in the development of methods and facilities for information-handling and access.

11. In the area of experimental approaches to the adaptation of machine processing to the storage and retrieval of intelligence information, an encouraging beginning has been made within the National Security Agency where the Technical Information Processing System (TIPS) study is presently under way. This experiment, although on a limited scale and confined to a selected number of organizational units and information files within the National Security Agency, is producing important lessons for the achievement of a realistic system for the interrogation of a computer by remote users requiring access to a common information base.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

We recommend that the following actions be undertaken immediately within the intelligence community:

Recommendation No. 1: That selected personnel among the departments and agencies making up the U. S. intelligence community be provided specialized training and advanced studies at a university center or centers where systems thinking and systems skills are understood and imparted, and which at the same time possess adequate background in conventional bibliography and other more classical approaches to literature and information management.

/An example of the type of specialized training center we have in mind is the Library School at the University of Chicago, headed by Dean Don W. Swanson. His background in mathematics and physical sciences, and his current emphasis on increased systems thinking in library education, accent the combination of educational capabilities and background which are considered necessary for purposes of meeting the objective of this recommendation.

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Arrangements involving this and perhaps other
institutions might be made so that both senior
administrative personnel and more junior operating
people could acquire new abilities and attitudes
which in the times ahead will be demanded in the
discharging of responsibilities for the enormous
file and distribution systems of the intelligence
community./

Recommendation No. 2: That the Technical Information
Processing System (TIPS) project, now under way within the
National Security Agency, be expanded to include partici-
pation by other member agencies of the intelligence
community in an experimental operating system constituting
a first step toward interagency (and interbuilding) information
handling. Since results should be sought from the experi-
ment as promptly as feasible, the participation of other
agencies should be achieved by September of 1965; the
capability for extensive handling of the Russian biography
problem should be available in the community-wide system
by the summer of 1966; and by the summer of 1967 it should
be possible to exchange outputs from various mechanized
sources in the fashion pioneered by the TIPS project.

/Only through such experimental operational trials
can the intelligence community come to grips with
the wide variety of program problems involved,
including those of security compartmentation, the
encryption of communications between the computer/
information base and the user locations, and other
problems. In order to make such a trial effective,
it may be necessary to expand the scope of the
information maintained in the TIPS system and, if so,
this should be done with caution as to the total
amount of material thus added. The intention should
be to establish a system that will in fact be used
by workers in at least a few agencies as a better
way to meet day-to-day tasks; however, the system
should be regarded as experimental and there should
be no attempt to insure that in its experimental
form its operation can be economically justified./

Recommendation No. 3: That there be established
a Panel, under the joint sponsorship of the Special
Assistant to the President for Science and Technology
and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board,
having responsibility for: (a) providing guidance
to the intelligence community in the forwarding of
methods and facilities for information handling and access;

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(b) evaluating in technical terms the true meaning of the enormous and somewhat heterogeneous growth of the intelligence community's information pool.

/This recommended action is an urgent consequence of the USIB's Community Information Processing Study involving actions which, although helpful, are far from meeting the needs accented by the study. It is emphasized that the proposed panel of technical experts would not be tasked with the too obvious assignment of simply applying modern machine methods to the existing, specialized, and rigidly-maintained activities of processing and distributing information within the intelligence community. The panel would have the over-all task of guiding the necessarily large, and presently ignored, planning for the realistic and long-term development of mechanized facilities for the processing of information in the manifold forms in which it is encountered within the intelligence community. Thus, the composition of the panel and its individual skills should permit a concurrent approach to the overwhelming volumes of photographic, electrical and typographical material with which the intelligence system is presently flooded. It is noted that in such parts of the Government as the Bureau of the Budget, and in the Departments of State and Defense, attempts are being made to introduce automatic data-processing and information-handling systems into complex Government operations -- and the panel of technical experts could provide invaluable linkage among these detached efforts which now find some coherence only through the science and technical information people in the Office of Science and Technology and the Federal Council for Science and Technology. Finally, it is evident that the concept of the range of activities of the expert panel includes not only drawing on all the information-handling programs and activities in other parts of the Government, but also being available for over-all counsel in ways which might be especially useful to the Bureau of the Budget in understanding the role of mechanized information handling throughout the Executive Branch of the Government./

For the Board

Clark M. Clifford
Chairman

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6 March 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary, USIB

SUBJECT   :   Systems Training

    1.   This is in response to your request for my views on comments received from DIA, AEC and FBI on CODIB's proposal to USIB on Systems Training (USIB-D-39.7/20).

    2.   The position of DIA, reflecting that of the Army, is altogether understandable and reasonable. USIB members will obviously implement the proposed recommendations at differing levels and times depending upon programs now under- way and budgetary restrictions presently in force. Such limitations could be noted in USIB minutes, but should not require amendments to the report itself.

    3.   The AEC comment can be accepted at face value. If you don't have a big intelligence organization, you have no need for what is being proposed.

    4.   To some extent, what applies to the AEC is also applicable to the FBI. The FBI, however, is a key agency in the name-check community. The FBI biographic problem is enormous, and they have been notoriously slow in attacking it on grounds that it was either too big or not of community concern. The FBI needs what is being proposed as much or more than any other USIB agency. However, I don't see us doing anything about it.

    5.   In short, my recommendation is that USIB construe the action of DIA, AEC and FBI as concurrence, while noting the accompanying comment.

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Chairman
USIB Committee on Documentation

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP	2 March 1967

TO:

               D/ISS

ROOM NO.	BUILDING
7G00	**Hq.**

REMARKS:

    I would like to have your views on the attached comments which have been received from DIA, AEC and FBI regarding the CODIB report on Systems Training for Intelligence Personnel.

NSC review completed - unredacted segments may be declassified

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FROM:

            ExSec/USIB

ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241   REPLACES FORM 36-8   ☆ GPO : 1957—O-439445   (47)

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

2 8 FEB 1967

S-2070/MS-4

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Systems Training for Intelligence Personnel (USIB-D-39.7/20)

References: a. ACSI memorandum for USIB, subject: Systems Training for Intelligence Personnel, dated 24 February 1967, enclosed.

           b. Mr. McGeorge Bundy's memorandum for the DCI, subject: U. S. Intelligence Community Capabilities for the Handling of Intelligence Information, dated July 15, 1965.

1. Reference memorandum is forwarded herewith. It indicates some of the practical difficulties which will be encountered by the Army in carrying out recommendation 6.b. of subject paper. DIA will work with the Army in an attempt to resolve these problems.

2. Recognizing that the factors enumerated in reference memorandum will serve to delay implementation of recommendation 6.b. in the Army, it is felt that the recommendation is still valid in view of the President's approval of the PFIAB recommendation on information science training (reference 1.b.).

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

ROBERT R. GLASS
MAJOR GENERAL, USA
CHIEF OF STAFF

1 Enclosure a/s

NSC review completed - may be declassified in full

UNCLASSIFIED WHEN ATTACHMENTS ARE DETACHED

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

ACSI-DSRSID | NSC review completed - may be declassified in full |

24 FEB 1967

MEMORANDUM THRU: DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

       FOR: UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Systems Training for Intelligence Personnel

1. Reference, Memorandum, United States Intelligence Board, USIB-D-39.7/20, 16 February 1967, same subject.

2. The following comments on the recommendation in Section 6, pages 21 and 22 of the CODIB report forwarded by reference are furnished for consideration.

    a. Implementation must be accomplished within the provisions of applicable personnel policy and statutory requirements.

    b. It may not be practicable to program personnel into a university graduate information science program in the Fall of 1967 as:

       (1) The program has not been established or advertised. Hence, there are no applications on hand.

   (2) Agreements have not been concluded with universities.

       (3) Selection procedures would preclude Fall 1967 matriculation.

    c. Full implementation of these recommendations would place increased demands upon the current Army Training program. The President has directed, through the Secretary of Defense, a cut back on all training which is not in direct support of action in Vietnam. Training funds have already been reduced.

JAMES L. COLLINS, JR.
Brigadier General, GS
Deputy for Combat Intelligence
Reconnaissance and Mapping

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UNITED STATES
**ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION**
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

FEB 2 8 1967

NSC review completed - unredacted segments may be declassified

Dear Jim:

Reference is made to USIB-D-39.7/20, the AEC concurs
in substance with the recommendation of the CODIB Report,
CODIB-D-113/517, "Information Science Training for
Intelligence Community Personnel." However, with regard
to Recommendation 6b and 6c thereof it is noted that the
vast majority of automatic data processing and computer
facilities and personnel within the Commission program
are engaged in work associated with the AEC's respon-
sibilities for the production of nuclear materials and
weapons, and for the dissemination to the public of
scientific and technical information under the Atomic
Energy Act. These systems are now so programmed and the
demands are such that their useful extension to intelligence
functions is doubtful at this time.

Sincerely yours,

Howard C. Brown, Jr.
Assistant General Manager

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Executive Secretary
USIB

March 1, 1967

The FBI concurs in recommendations
a, d, e, and f.

The FBI does not object to other USIB
agencies supporting recommendations b and c.
However, the FBI will continue to follow its
policy regarding training, assignment, promotion,
and advancement which best meet the needs of
the FBI and which are in keeping with established
policies in these fields. This would include the
training and/or assignment of personnel in the
field of information science. In addition, because
the needs of the FBI for training of personnel in
this specific area are limited, there appears to
be no necessity for a running inventory of personnel
resources or related scheduling of qualified
personnel for future training.

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASCATION TOP AND BOTTOM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	EA/DCI		
2	Chairman, USIB	3/25/67 Signed	
3	ExSec/USIB		
4			
	NSC review completed - unredacted segments may be declassified		
6			

ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN	
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE	

Remarks:

All other USIB members have concurred in the recommendations in the CODIB report on Systems Training for Intelligence Personnel.

In concurring however, DIA, AEC and FBI submitted comments. These are attached along with a memorandum from [   ] briefly summarizing his views on them (see Tab E).

In order to complete Board action it is requested that you approve the CODIB report, and also sign the Memorandum for the Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Tab C) and the Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense (Tab D) which have been prepared by [   ]

(Date para-1 25 March 1967)

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER		
	RESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
	Acting ExSec/USIB	17 Mar

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